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The leading role of Europeanisation 
Poland has made a commitment to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol1 and by participating in the climate policy of the 
European Union (EU). The above commitments have influence on a number of 
areas of Polish government’s activity, including environment, energy and 
economic sectors. The law of the European Union binding for all the Member 
States makes particularly significant impact. That applies primarily to EU 
regulations known under the name of the EU Climate and Energy Package  (CEP), 
which was negotiated in 2008 and has been successively introduced into the EU 
legal system. The above-mentioned regulations make a much stronger impact in 
Poland than the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
adopted in Kyoto. In the area of environmental protection, the EU law has the 
priority of application over other international obligations. In addition, the CEP 
introduces much stricter requirements for the reduction of greenhouse gases 
emissions and imposes higher costs on the adjustment of Polish energy sector and 
other sectors of Polish economy to the requirements of the EU law2. The influence 
of the EU on the Member States during the course of European integration is 
described in the literature of the subject as Europeanisation3. In this study I will 
analyse the influence on the policy of the Polish government with respect to 
stimulating the development of low carbon economy (including industry).  
                                                 
1 Kyoto Protocol – supplements the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was 
signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Protocol was negotiated in Kyoto in December 1997. The Treaty came 
into force in 2005. See The Kyoto Protocol to the Unite Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
done in Kyoto on 11 December 1997 r., Journal of Laws  2005 no. 203 item 1684.  
2 More: R. Jeszke, A. Błachowicz, E. Smol, P. Sikora, S. Lizak, M. Pyrka (2009): Wybrane aspekty wdrażania 
Pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego [Selected aspects of the implementation of the Climate and Energy 
Package, KASHUE-KOBiZE, Warsaw, p. 13; M. Pyrka, S. Lizak (2009): Zjawisko ucieczki emisji w sektorach 
energochłonnych w Polsce w kontekście zmian wprowadzanych w systemie EU ETS na lata 2013-2020 [Emission 
leakage in the energy-intensive sectors in Poland in the context of the changes introduced to the EU ETS for 
the years 2013-2020], KASHUE-KOBiZE, Warsaw, p. 8; Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji 
Gazów Cieplarnianych [Green Book of the National Programme for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gases Emissions], 
Społeczna Rada Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji, Warsaw 2010, p. 29; Ocena potencjału redukcji 
emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2030, McKinsey&Company, Warsaw 2009; Energy and CO2 
emissions scenarios of Poland, International Energy Agency, OECD 2010; Transition to a Low-emissions Economy 
In Poland, World Bank, Washington 2011; K. Żmijewski (2011): Zagrożenie problemem carbon leakage w Polsce 
[Risk of carbon leakage in Poland], E. Kwiatkowski Institute, Warsaw.  
3 See T. A. Börzel (2005): Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States, w The Member 
States of the European Union, (ed.) S. Bulmer, Ch. Lequesne, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York; T. 
A. Börzel, T. Risse (2007): Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of EU Politics, w Handbook of European Union 
Politics, (ed.) K. E. Jørgensen, M. A. Pollack, B. J. Rosamond, Sage, London; M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso, T. 
Risse (ed.) (2001): Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, NY; K. Featherstone, C. M. Radaelli (red.) (2003): The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford; New York; P. Mair (2004): The Europeanization dimension (Review), Journal of European Public 
Policy, 11(2): 337–348; C. M. Radaelli (2003): The Europeanization of Public Policy, in The Politics of 
Europeanization, (ed.) K. Featherstone, C. M. Radaelli, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York. See also 
other definitions of Europeanisation: J.P. Olsen (2002): The many faces of Europeanization, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, no. 40 (5), 921-952. 
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The CEP targets are commonly referred to as “3 times 20 for 2020” and are as 
follows: 
 To achieve 20% increase in energy efficiency in relation to the BAU scenario4 by 
the year 2020; 
 To increase the share of energy from renewable sources up to 20% of the final 
energy consumption in the EU by the year 2020; 
 To reduce by at least 20% the emission of greenhouse gases in relation to 1990 
levels by the year 2020, with an option of further reduction even to 30%, 
provided that other developed countries commit themselves to a similar 
reduction of emissions and the selected developing countries make an 
appropriate contribution adequate to their reduction capabilities. It is worth 
noticing that some European politicians insist5, that the EU should make a 
unilateral commitment to reduce gas emissions by 30% regardless of the 
position taken by countries outside Europe. In addition, the European 
Commission6 proposes a further reduction of emissions in 2050 by 80-95% 
relative to 1990 levels.   
In Poland it is particularly difficult to meet the CEP criteria. There are several 
factors that make it so. The first one is the very poor condition of Polish energy 
infrastructure. Experts’ estimates show7, that about 40% of power generating units 
are over 40 years old. 15% are over 50 and they should be immediately stopped 
and disconnected from the grid. More than 70% of power units are 30 years old or 
older. Decapitalisation of power plants exceeds 73%, of transmission networks 
71%, distribution networks 75% and the depreciation of the heating sector exceeds 
63%. The already poor condition of the infrastructure is worsening systematically 
and this phenomenon has been counteracted neither by the process of privatisation 
of the energy sector nor by commercial or public investment of recent years. Their 
scale is too small as compared to the needs and, in addition, the projects are often 
blocked by some formal or legal ambiguities arising from the implementation of 
CEP. The main issue is the protracted work of the EU institutions on the details of 
the Package and especially the scope of the free emission allowances for the energy 
sector in the years 2013-20208. Polish government’s estimates9 show that in the 
                                                 
4 BAU – (business as usual) – a scenario in which no additional action is foreseen with respect to energy 
efficiency.  
5 Hedegaard backtracks on EU climate goals, EurActiv, 27 May 2010; Climate change: Commission invites to an 
informed debate on the impacts of the move to 30% EU greenhouse gas emissions cut if and when the conditions are met, 
European Commission, Brussels, IP-10-618, 26 May 2010.   
6 See A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy In 2050, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM(2011) 112/4, Brussels 8.3.2011. 
7 See Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych pp. 32-35.  
8 J. Piszczatowska, K. Baca (2010): Firmy wstrzymują węglowe inwestycje, Rzeczpospolita daily, 08-02-2010; J. 
Piszczatowska (2011): Polska potrzebuje nowych elektrowni, Rzeczpospolita daily, 03-02-2011; A. Łakoma, K. 
Baca (2011): Plany UE szkodzą elektrowniom, Rzeczpospolita daily, 11-03-2011.  
9 Polska 2030, Prime Minister’s Chancellery, Warsaw 2009, pp. 176, 180-181. Some experts point out that the 
demand for energy will indeed grow but it will still be smaller than the estimates included in the report 
Polska 2030. See Z. M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, M. Sobolewski (2009): Polityka klimatyczna Polski – wyzwanie 
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coming years it will be necessary to double the existing energy generating capacity. 
Investment in modernisation and in new capacity should reach 86 billion PLN 
(21.5 billion euro) by 2015 and another 49 billion PLN (12.2 billion euro) by the 
year 2030. Without this investment, energy deficit (shortfall in supply) will appear 
as early as 2011. It will reach about 25% in relation to the needs by the year 2030  
(in a scenario where the necessary modernisation has not been carried out)  
(see Figure 1). What is more, the depreciation of the energy infrastructure is the 
reason why the potential of emissions reduction in Poland by the year 2020 is only 
3 percent (in relation to the year 2005). Any possibilities of growth of this potential 
appear only after 2020, provided that significant investment will have been made10.  
 
Figure 1: Estimated energy deficit 2011-2030 
Sources: Polska 2030, Prime Minister’s Chancellery, Warsaw 2009, p. 180. 
 
 
Secondly, the energy sector in Poland is not very efficient, which is in part caused 
by the poor condition of the infrastructure. The energy intensity of the economy is 
one of the highest in the European Union (see Figure 2). According to the 
government’s estimates11 it is approximately three times higher than in the “old” 
Member States (EU15). It is worth noting that the level of energy intensity went 
down significantly in the 1990s as a result of the deindustrialisation which 
accompanied the economic transformation process as well as the improvement of 
economic effectiveness of the remaining enterprises adapting to the free market 
conditions. Privatisation and the inflow of new technologies together with the new 
industrial investment also played an important role. 
                                                                                                                                                     
XXI wieku, Polski Klub Ekologiczny, Warsaw, p. 53. 
10 Ocena potencjału redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2030, p. 10.  
11 Polska 2030, p. 172.  
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Figure 2: Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per EUR 1 000 of GDP) 
Sources: Europe in figures. Eurostat yearbook 2010, Eurostat 2010. 
 
 
Thirdly, close to 90% of energy in Poland is generated from coal and lignite (the EU 
average is less than 30%). This results from the fact that Poland’s own coal 
resources are relatively big, which is the reason why a coal-based economy is of 
great significance in Poland as far as the national energy security is concerned. It is, 
however, a high emission source of energy, generating twice as much CO2 as 
natural gas. That is why the implementation of CEP is much more expensive in 
Poland than in other EU countries, for example in those which base their energy 
generation on gas (the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom), nuclear 
energy (France, Sweden, Belgium, Lithuania, Slovakia) or renewable sources 
(Austria, Latvia, Sweden, Finland). The share of energy from renewable sources 
(RSE) in Poland in 2008 reached only 7,6%, whereas the EU average was at that 
time close to 18%12. In the opinion of the government experts13 it will be difficult to 
achieve the CEP targets in this respect (for Poland they are 15% RSE by 2020). As a 
result, Poland is one of the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases in the EU (see 
Table 1). In relation to the potential of its economy (measured with the GDP 
purchasing power parity) Poland is one of the countries with highest investment 
needs and poorest possibilities of their fulfilment. Most of the new EU Member 
States from Central Europe belong to that group.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Energia ze źródeł odnawialnych w 2009 r., Central Statistical Office, Warszawa 2010, p. 18.  
13 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 89.  
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Table 1: Greenhouse gas emissions 
Sources: Europe in figures. Eurostat yearbook 2010, Eurostat 2010; 2010 Key World Energy Statistics, International 
Energy Agency 2010.  
    
CO2 emissions / 
GDP (PPP) 
(kg CO2 / 2000 USD) 
Weighted emissions of greenhouse gases 
(million tonnes of CO2 equivalent) 
    2008 Rank   1997 2002 2007 
Share in 
EU-27 
(%)  Rank 
  EU-27 
  
  - 5 065,7 5 045,4 -   
  Euro area : 
 
  3.365.1 3 414,5 3 364,1 66,7   
 
OECD 0,38 
       
  Belgium 0,34 
 
  145,1 142,9 131,3 2,6   
  Bulgaria 0,64 2   83,8 66,5 75,8 1,5   
  Czech Republic 0,54 3   153,0 145,1 150,8 3,0   
  Denmark 0,28 
 
  79,8 68,6 66,6 1,3   
  Germany 0,34 
 
  - 1 006,4 956,1 19,0 1  
  Estonia 0,78 1   21,3 18,1 22,0 0,4   
  Ireland 0,28 
 
  62,8 68,8 69,2 1,4   
  Greece 0,34 
 
  118,1 127,8 131,9 2,6   
  Spain 0,29 
 
  332,7 403,1 442,3 8,8 5  
  France 0,21 
 
  564,6 549,3 531,1 10,5 4  
  Italy 0,28 
 
  528,7 555,8 552,8 11,0 3  
  Cyprus 0,42 5   7,5 9,3 10,1 0,2   
  Latvia 0,24 
 
  12,0 10,7 12,1 0,2   
  Lithuania 0,26 
 
  22,6 20,6 24,7 0,5   
  Luxembourg 0,33 
 
  9,8 11,3 12,9 0,3   
  Hungary 0,33 
 
  79,9 78,0 75,9 1,5   
  Malta 0,33 
 
  2,6 2,8 3,0 0,1   
  Netherlands 0,33 
 
  225,9 215,5 207,5 4,1   
  Austria 0,25 
 
  83,1 87,0 88,0 1,7   
  Poland 0,53 4   449,1 371,5 398,9 7,9 6  
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  Portugal 0.28 
 
  71,4 88,8 81,8 1,6   
  Romania 0.41 6   166,7 146,7 152,3 3,0   
  Slovenia 0.34 
 
  19,6 20,1 20,7 0,4   
  Slovakia 0.38 
 
  49,9 49,0 47,0 0,9   
  Finland 0.34 
 
  75,7 76,8 78,4 1,6   
  Sweden 0,15 
 
  72,6 69,6 65,4 1,3   
  United Kingdom 0,28 
 
  708,1 655,8 636,7 12,6 2  
 
Therefore, with respect to energy and climate policy, Europeanisation forces 
Poland (and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) to bear high 
adjustment costs. They may have some serious consequences for the functioning of 
individual economies, they may also reduce their competitiveness in the cost-
effectiveness aspect, both on the common market and in the global trade. Even 
more so as the CEP does not take into account the specific nature of those 
countries’ energy sectors (e.g. it does not make a distinction  between the more 
difficult starting points of the coal-based economies). In principle, it does not take 
into account the difference in the level of development of individual countries, 
either. For example, the division of the emission rights introduced in the EU (the so 
called EU ETS) assumes that only 10 percent of the rights will be distributed on the 
basis of the GDP per capita criterion14. That makes a fundamental difference in 
comparison to the Kyoto Protocol, where the former socialist countries were 
treated  less strictly and were expected to reduce their emissions only by 6 percent 
in relation to 1988 levels. According to experts, Poland has more than fulfilled that 
target (having reduced its emissions relative to the base year by approx. 30 
percent)15. The Climate and Energy Package has not only introduced higher targets 
but it has also failed to take into account the reduction made in post-socialist 
countries in the 1990s. This is connected with the fact that under the EU system for 
managing the green house gases emissions, the year 2005 has been adopted as the 
main reference point and, in addition, the Community emission trading scheme 
(EU ETS) calculates the emission allowances (and the related reduction) for the 
entire Union.  
Specialists also point to other elements of the CEP which are disadvantageous 
for the less vigorously developing economies of Central Europe. For instance, the 
allocation of the free emission rights in the years 2013-2020 for the industrial 
sectors threatened with relocation of production (“emissions leakage”) is made on 
the basis of the benchmarks from the most effective and technologically advanced 
                                                 
14 For this reason, in the years 2013-2020 Poland may count on only 30 million emission rights, which accounts for less 
than 1 percent of the total number of emission rights for that period of time. See R. Jeszke, A. Błachowicz, E. Smol, P. 
Sikora, S. Lizak, M. Pyrka (2009): Wybrane aspekty wdrażania Pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego, KASHUE-
KOBiZE, Warszawa, p. 9.  
15 Z. M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, M. Sobolewski (2009), p. 44.  
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installations in the European Union. It is beneficial for the best developing 
countries with modern energy sector and the economies highly saturated with 
energy efficient technology. The allocation of emission rights does not take into 
account the fuel specificity of individual economies, which will be unfavourable 
for the countries with coal-based economies16. Some industries in Poland (…) will 
receive fewer emission rights needed for production than their competitors in other EU 
Member States”17. It is estimated that for this reason, Polish economy will receive 
approximately 30% fewer emission rights18. That is why experts foresee  
a possibility of reduction of foreign investment in the sensitive sectors or relocation 
of production to other EU Member States with lower production costs19. In Poland, 
the enterprises that belong to the most energy intense sectors are the most 
threatened: smelting, chemical and refinery sectors, mineral and paper sectors20. 
Some sectors have not been included by the European Commission (EC) on the list 
of free emission rights at all because of the risk of “emissions leakage”21.  
Poland has found itself in the group of states enjoying, in the years 2013-2020, 
the right of derogation of the paid emission rights in the power generation sector 
(it has received up to 70 percent of free emission rights in 2013, to be gradually 
reduced in the subsequent years). It will probably slow the pace of the energy price 
hikes for companies and individual consumers. Nevertheless, the European 
Commission exerts pressure on Poland to make it use the free emission rights to 
the least possible extent22. It has also proposed to link the derogation with 
additional investment in CCS installations23.  The  prolonged negotiations have 
almost completely frozen the investment in the energy sector in Poland24, and they 
even prompt some companies to withdraw from the Polish market25. Whereas in 
the sectors not included in the EU ETS (transport, agriculture, housing etc.) Poland 
has the possibility to increase the emissions by 14%. According to experts26 the 
forecasted growth of emissions in the years 2005-2030 amounts here to as much as 
68%, which is the reason why the decision of the EC is highly insufficient. The 
growth of emissions in transport is, to a great extent, stimulated by transport sector 
investment projects funded from EU funds.    
In conclusion, it should be noted that the consequences of introducing the CEP 
will be particularly strong in the countries with a disadvantageous energy mix and 
                                                 
16 See R. Jeszke, A. Błachowicz, E. Smol, P. Sikora, S. Lizak, M. Pyrka (2009), p. 13; M. Pyrka, S. Lizak (2009) p. 8; 
Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 29.  
17 M. Pyrka, S. Lizak (2009), p. 38.  
18 E. Smol (2010): Metodyka wraz z przykładowym obliczeniem „limitu” krajowej emisji gazów cieplarnianych dla Polski 
na lata 2013-2020, KASHUE-KOBiZE, Warszawa, p. 11. 
19 M. Pyrka, S. Lizak (2009), p. 9. 
20 Ibidem, pp. 13, 16, 39; Efektywność wykorzystania energii w latach 1998-2008, Central Statistical Office, Warszawa 
2010, pp. 44-45. 
21 In Poland that applies to the manufacturers of bricks and roof tiles. See R. Jeszke, A. Błachowicz, E. Smol, P. Sikora, S. 
Lizak, M. Pyrka (2009), p. 17.  
22 Bruksela utrudnia darmową emisję CO2, Rzeczpospolita daily 24-01-2011.  
23 CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage): installations for capturing and storage of CO2. See Unia uderzy w inwestycje w 
polskich elektrowniach, Rzeczpospolita daily, 15-02-2011.   
24 Elektrownie czekają w napięciu, Rzeczpospolita daily, 28-01-2010.  
25 Członek zarządu zapowiada, że Vattenfall sprzeda swój biznes w Polsce, Gazeta Wyborcza daily, 20-01-2011.  
26 Statement made by A. Kassenberg during the conference „Droga ku efektywnemu wdrażaniu PEK” [Towards effective 
implementation of CEP], 18 November 2009, Warsaw.  
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at the same time weaker economies. In the case of Poland the necessary investment 
is estimated to be at the level of 92 billion euro by the year 203027. Experts of the 
International Energy Agency28 estimate the total costs of the implementation of 
CEP and the enhancement and modernisation of the energy infrastructure in 
Poland to amount to 195 billion euro at the same time. Domestic experts29 assume 
that even higher costs will be involved: from 265 to 320 billion euro. The scale of 
this investment is disproportionate to the level of economic development.  
According to some estimates, the huge scale of investment imposed by the CEP 
will bring GDP growth and increase of employment in the whole European Union. 
According to German experts30, the reduction of CO2 emissions to the level of 30 
percent will increase the EU GDP in 2020 by 5.7% and will reduce the number of 
the unemployed by more than 30%. These estimates do not, however, take into 
consideration the negative economic consequences. The predictions for Poland 
include an increase of the production costs, lower competitiveness of the economy 
and outflow of production investment outside the country. According to EU 
experts31, in Poland, the employment in the sectors at risk of transfer abroad of 
high emission and energy-intensive industries is the highest in the EU and exceeds 
9% of all people employed in industry (the average rate for the EU is less than 3%). 
This means that in the face of a significant scale of investment, business may be 
more willing to transfer the production than to bear the high costs. According  
to World Bank experts, implementation of the CEP in Poland will have adverse 
effects on the speed of economic growth, at the average annual level of 1 percent of 
GDP by the year 2030. The years around 2020 will be the most difficult ones, then 
the costs of the Package may reach even 2 percent of GDP. It is also possible that 
employment will fall annually on average by 140 thousand people (approx.  
1 percent of all the employed)32. The estimates of Polish experts33 are even more 
alarming (average 2% fall of GDP and an almost 2 percent rise in unemployment). 
Thus Europeanisation brings asymmetrical consequences for individual EU 
Member States, it is more beneficial for the richer economies, with better-
developed environment-friendly technology and less dependent on coal.  
In addition, the European policy does not take into consideration the domestic 
energy resources in Poland, which is an aspect of economic security.    
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Ocena potencjału redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2030, p. 17.  
28 Energy and CO2 emissions scenarios of Poland, International Energy Agency, OECD 2010, p. 4.  
29 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 31.  
30 A New Growth Path for Europe, European Climate Forum, Potsdam 2011, p. 9.  
31 ReRisk Regions at Risk of Energy Poverty, The ESPON 2013 Programme, Version 31/03/2010, p. 2.  
32 Por. Transition to a Low-emissions Economy In Poland, pp. 15-17.  
33 K. Żmijewski (2011), p. 5.  
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Strategy of the Polish government for the support of low 
carbon economy 
The worsening collapse of the energy infrastructure in Poland has not proved to be 
a sufficient reason for subsequent governments to undertake appropriate strategic 
action. It shows the weakness of the long-term economic policy of the state34. 
Polish climate policy has emerged under the influence of the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol. It should, however, be noted that it has not included any active 
economic policy of the government as the reduction of emissions took place 
spontaneously, as a result of industrial restructuring during the system 
transformation and the privatisation process. This has even prompted the Polish 
government to adopt an ambitious emissions reduction target of 40% by the year 
2020 relative to the base year of 198835.  
The situation has changed following the European integration, and especially 
under the influence of the Climate and Energy Package36. Poland has started 
various planning activities, which initially concerned mainly the area of ecology 
and only later touched upon the economy (mainly the energy sector, and, to a 
lesser extent, other sectors. The actions of the Polish authorities are therefore taken, 
to a great extent, in reaction to the European regulations and policies. Their 
primary role is to implement the Europeanisation requirements and to a much 
lesser extent – to pursue the long-term national interests. What is more, they are 
implemented with significant delay (in relation to the strategic discussions at the 
EU level). Another drawback is the political passivity in the European arena37. 
Poland joined the CEP negotiations too late, without proper preparation based on 
estimating the costs for Polish economy of implementing the Package38. For 
example, appropriate statistical data concerning Polish voivodships were not submitted. 
As a result, the EU documents39 have not included Polish regions among those most 
threatened with the transfer of the high emission and energy intensive industries. This 
shows the weakness of the long-term economic policy, which, in the conditions of 
European integration, requires active participation in the planning of European 
policies. It is also clear that there is no political continuity of the subsequent governments 
and both the documents and the strategic goals are widely dispersed, especially at the 
ministry level. What is more, they are not sufficiently coordinated40.   
                                                 
34 On the weakness of the Polish government economic policy, among others: D. Klonowski (2010): The effectiveness of 
government-sponsored programmes in supporting the SME sector in Poland, Post-Communist Economies, vol. 22, no. 
2, 229-245; T. G. Grosse (2010): Bariery dla skoku cywilizacyjnego Polski 2010-2030, in: A. Kukliński, K. 
Pawłowski, J. Woźniak (ed.): Polonia quo vadis? Biblioteka Małopolskiego Obserwatorium Polityki Rozwoju, 3rd 
vol., Kraków, p. 93-115.  
35 See Polityka Klimatyczna Polski. Strategie redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2020, Ministry of 
Environment, Warsaw, a document adopted by the Council of Ministers on 04 November 2003, p. 14.  
36 An interview with D. Ledworowski (Public Board for the national Programme of Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011; 
an interview with T. Chruszczow (Ministry of Environment), March 2011.  
37 Z. M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, M. Sobolewski (2009), p. 45. 
38 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011; an interview with D. Kulczycka 
(PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011; an interview with D. Ledworowski (Public Board for the national Programme of 
Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011.  
39 ReRisk Regions at Risk of Energy Poverty, p. 14-15. This point is also made by: K. Żmijewski (2011), p. 10. 
40 An interview with A. Błachowicz (Ministry of Environment), March 2011.  
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The main strategic document in the recent years has been the National 
Development Strategy 2007-2015 (NDS) adopted in the autumn of 200641. After the 
change of government in 2007 the document became only a front, without any 
great political significance. Even though the new cabinet adopted initial proposals 
for an update of the NDS42, yet it later practically suspended any work on that and 
began to prepare a separate document designed to be  a long-term strategy for 
national development. By the end of the government’s term in office such a 
document was not produced. In this situation, the fundamental documents setting 
the government policy for the years 2007-2011 is the National Reform Plan for the 
years 2008-2011 (NRP)43 and the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-
2013 (NSRF)44. Both documents have been prepared under the influence of the 
European Union and to bring Polish policymaking into line with EU regulations 
and directions. The former was supposed to implement the Lisbon Strategy in 
Poland, whereas the latter implements the cohesion policy. Table 2 shows a list of  
the main priorities included in the above-mentioned documents.  
Table 2: Priorities of the Polish government’s economic policy (2007-2011) 
Government 
strategic 
documents 
Main priorities 
(in brackets – the order of priorities in a given document) 
NDS  
2007-2015 
Increased 
competitiveness and 
innovation of 
economy (1) 
Improvement of 
the condition of 
technical and 
social 
infrastructure (2) 
Increase of 
employment 
and 
improvement 
of its quality 
(3) 
Building an 
integrated 
social 
community 
and its 
security (4) 
Development 
of rural areas 
(5) 
Regional 
development 
and the 
improvement of 
territorial 
cohesion (6)  
NRP  
2008-2011 
Innovative economy 
(2)  
 Active society 
(1)  
Efficient 
institutions (3) 
  
NSRF  
2007-2013 
Improving the 
competitiveness and 
innovativeness of 
enterprises, 
including in 
particular the 
manufacturing 
sector with high 
added value and 
development of the 
services sector (4)  
Establishment 
and 
modernisation 
of technical and 
social 
infrastructure 
crucial for better 
competitiveness 
of Poland (3)  
Improving the 
human capital 
quality and 
enhancing 
social 
cohesion (2) 
Improving the 
functioning 
standard of 
public 
institutions 
and 
development 
of partnership 
mechanisms 
(1)  
Balancing 
growth 
opportunities 
and 
supporting 
structural 
changes in 
rural areas (6)  
Increase of the 
competitiveness 
of Polish regions 
and preventing 
their social, 
economic and 
territorial 
marginalisation 
(5) 
Summary Innovative 
economy 
Development of 
infrastructure 
Development 
of human 
capital 
Institutional 
Development 
Development 
of rural areas 
Regional 
development 
                                                 
41 Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2007-2015[National Development Strategy], Ministry of Regional Development, Warszawa 
2006.  
42 Założenia aktualizacji Strategii Rozwoju Kraju 2007-2015 [Proposals for the update of the National Development 
Strategy], Ministry of Regional Development, Warszawa 2008.  
43 Krajowy Program Reform na lata 2008-2011 na rzecz realizacji Strategii Lizbońskiej [National Reform Programme for 
the years 2008-2011 for the implementation of Lisbon Strategy], Ministry of Economy, Warszawa 2008.  
44 Narodowe Strategiczne Ramy Odniesienia 2007-2013 [National Strategic Reference Framework] (document approved 
by a decision of the European Commission), Ministry of Regional Development, Warszawa 2007.  
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In the strategic documents under analysis, six main priorities can be found. They 
all refer to the higher goal of building the competitiveness of Polish economy. 
Among the priorities, three seem to be of the greatest importance for the state’s 
economic policy: (1) development of innovative economy, (2) infrastructure for the 
purposes of economic competitiveness and  (3) human capital. The priority 
concerning institutional development aims at improving the effectiveness of the 
implementation of public policies, and especially the implementation of the 
policies, regulations and funds of the EU. Whereas the remaining priorities 
concerning development of rural areas and regions in fact implement the already 
mentioned priorities within the territorial system of the country.      
All the documents under analysis refer to the EU CEP. However, they refer to 
the objectives of the low carbon policy and development of the energy sector only 
in a very general way (Table 3). They focus on environmental protection and not 
on supporting the national economy in order to facilitate the adjustment to the 
requirements of Europeanisation. Having read those documents one finds  
it difficult to talk about the existence of a “green” industrial policy or a low carbon 
economic policy of the Polish government. The NDS is an exception here as  
it assumes the preparation of multi-annual programmes for the development of 
individual industries while assuring the fulfilment of the low carbon economy 
objectives and adapting to EU environmental regulations45. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the fact that even though the Polish government documents are 
prepared in response to the action taken by the European Union, in some areas it 
happens with a significant delay in relation to the work at the European level. 
Whereas in the most recent economic strategy of the EU “Europe 2020”, one of the 
most important development instruments is the “green” industrial policy46. In 
addition, the EU laws allow for public aid to the sectors threatened with high costs 
of energy purchase and relocation of production abroad. However, the EU 
regulations are not precise and, in addition, Poland has limited possibilities to 
grant aid in a situation where the public debt is growing.  
One should also remember that EU policies are internally diversified and 
sometimes even contradictory with respect to the scientific grounds and 
substantive goals they adopt. The documents of the Polish government refer 
mainly to the liberal ideas underpinning the EU competition policy and to the 
main direction of the cohesion policy which promotes the development of 
transport and environmental infrastructure47 in the countries of Central Europe. 
That is why, in the government documents, the role of transport and 
environmental protection infrastructure is emphasised stronger than the 
development of energy infrastructure. One can hardly see any activities  
of industrial policy that could support enterprises in the costly reduction of 
                                                 
45 See Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2007-2015, pp. 38, 46.  
46 Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, European Commission, COM(2010) 2020 final 
version, Brussels 3.3.2010, pp. 12-16.  
47 More: T. G. Grosse (2010): EU Cohesion Policy and the peripheries of the New Member States, in: Regional 
Development in Central and Eastern Europe, G. Gorzelak, J. Bachtler, M. Smętkowski (eds.), Routledge, London – 
New York, pp. 313-328.  
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greenhouse gases emissions. On the other hand, solutions liberalising the energy 
market are proposed as well as those promoting competition and privatisation of 
state owned enterprises.    
 
Table 3: Objectives of the Polish government’s economic policy (2007-2011) with respect to low 
carbon economy and development of energy sector 
Most important 
priorities of 
economic policy 
Main strategic documents 
NDS 2007-2015 NRP 2008-2011 NSRF 2007-2013 
Development of 
innovative 
economy 
- development of technologies for 
the protection of environment and 
reduction of greenhouse gases 
emissions ;  
- protection of competition, 
liberalisation of energy market, 
privatisation;  
- building of strong energy 
companies capable of competing 
internationally; 
- adapting the traditional 
industries to the requirements of 
environmental protection. 
- ensuring competition on 
energy market, 
privatisation;  
- using innovative 
solutions for protection of 
environment (including 
promotion of clean coal 
technologies); 
- promoting energy 
efficiency (including 
through taxation).   
- development and 
introduction of new 
environmental and energy 
technology.  
Development of 
infrastructure 
- improving energy security of the 
country, including through 
diversification of energy sources, 
development of distribution 
networks and the capacity for 
storage of energy resources; 
- improving energy efficiency;  
- development of RSE; 
- development of nuclear energy 
generation.  
- construction and 
modernisation of energy 
infrastructure, including 
electricity and gas; 
- development of RSE.   
- ensuring the energy security 
(including diversification of 
supply sources, construction 
of transmission networks with 
other EU countries and of 
storage capacity);  
- improving energy efficiency;  
- development of RSE. 
Development of 
human capital 
--- --- --- 
 
In none of the strategic documents under analysis there could be found proposals 
for action for human capital development which would be related to low carbon 
economy. Thus, one of the three main priorities of the economic policies of 
subsequent governments has not been practically included in the planning for 
emissions reduction. An additional problem is the fact that Poland does not have  
a tradition of preparing political strategies oriented towards solving one particular 
problem which would combine the activities of several ministries at the same time. 
For instance, there is no strategy for low carbon industrial policy that would 
coordinate the action of various ministries and at the same time would ensure the 
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implementation of the main priorities of the government’s economic policy48.  Even 
though in 2010, in the Ministry of Economy, the main assumptions of the National 
Programme for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gases Emissions49 were prepared, yet 
it is a document of a very general nature. It contains only some initial proposals for 
action which is in principle within the remit of the Ministry of Economy. 
Experience shows that individual ministries prepare their own sector-specific 
strategies which usually cover rather narrowly outlined tasks of a given ministry. 
The only exception is documents prepared by the Ministry of Regional 
Development (that is where NDS and NSRF have been produced). It was only in 
December 2010 that an inter-ministerial working group was formed whose task is 
to prepare the National Plan for the Development of Low Emission Economy, 
which will provide the basis for the low carbon economic policy of the Polish 
government. In view of the coming parliamentary elections, however, it is not at all 
clear whether this policy will be drafted in the near future.  
A number of sector-specific documents may be mentioned here which have 
been prepared recently and which aim at implementing the EU CEP in Poland50. 
Experts note51 that in Poland the climate policy has never been integrated with the 
economic policy. A strategy that, to the greatest extent, points to the government 
priorities related to low carbon economy is currently only the Polish Energy Policy 
until the year 2030 (PEP)52. It refers directly to the CEP, and the three main 
objectives of the Package have been transferred directly as priorities of the strategy. 
Thus the Polish energy sector strategy focuses more on the implementation of the 
CEP and less on the implementation of the national economic policy. This is clearly 
visible on the example of the rather scarce support instruments addressed to 
enterprises. Similarly as in the other documents described above, one of the main 
mechanisms for adapting the industry to EU regulations is market liberalisation, 
which leads largely to shifting the cost of new investment projects to energy 
consumers. The government is also trying to increase the obligations of local 
governments with respect to investment projects. An important priority of this 
strategy is the energy security. As I have mentioned before, in this respect the 
requirements of the CEP are a real challenge for Polish economy based on coal 
(and our own coal resources). That is why the government’s energy policy leads 
not only to diversification of directions of energy supply, construction of storage 
capacity, etc. but also to diversification of the energy mix. The point is to reduce 
the dominating position of coal as the energy source in Poland. Table 4 shows the 
planned objectives and activities of Polish government for reduction of greenhouse 
gases emissions. They have been prepared on the basis of PEP.  
                                                 
48 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011;  an interview with D. Kulczycka 
(PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011; an interview with M. Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), 
March 2011; an interview with D. Ledworowski (Public Board for the National Programme of Emissions’ Reduction), 
March 2011.  
49 Założenia Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, Ministry of Economy, Warsaw 2010.  
50 E.g. Polityka ekologiczna państwa w latach 2009-2012 z perspektywą do roku 2016 [National Environmental Policy in 
the years 2009-2012 with the perspective by the year 2016, Ministry of Environment, Warsaw 2008; Krajowy Plan 
Działań dotyczący efektywności energetycznej (EEAP), Ministry of Economy, Warsaw 2007.  
51 A. Kassenberg (2009). 
52 Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku, Ministry of Economy, Warsaw 2009.  
 Low Carbon Industrial Policy: An example of the impact of Europeanisation on Poland 
17 
 
Table 4. Objectives and activities for low carbon economy in relation to the economic policy 
priorities  (2007-2011) 
Main 
economic 
policy 
priorities 
 
Low carbon objectives (based on PEP) 
Advanced 
technologies 
Competition 
on energy 
market 
Energy 
efficiency  
Energy 
security 
Development 
of RSE (3) 
Development of 
nuclear energy 
Development 
of innovative 
economy  
- development of 
clean coal 
technologies 
(CCS) and their 
implementation 
in the economy;  
- development of 
technologies 
using methane 
released in coal 
mines; 
- development of 
other energy 
efficient 
technologies, 
including nuclear 
and RSE. 
- privatisation of 
energy and 
resource 
enterprises; 
- protection of 
competition in 
energy sectors,  
- removing 
barriers to 
changing the 
energy supplier 
by consumers;  
- liberalisation 
of energy 
market (incl. 
freeing energy 
prices for 
individual 
consumers),  
- creating 
markets for spot 
and futures / 
forward 
contracts for 
electricity; 
- formation of 
strong capital 
groups on the 
basis of existing 
resource and 
energy 
companies. 
- establishing 
the national 
target for 
increasing 
energy 
efficiency;  
- stimulating 
development of 
cogeneration;  
- marking of 
energy intensity 
of devices and 
products and 
introduction of 
energy 
consumption 
standards for 
them.  
 
 
- promoting the 
implementation 
of clean coal 
technologies,  
- increasing 
access to natural 
resources in 
Poland 
(including coal), 
- supporting 
access of Polish 
fuel companies to 
foreign deposits;  
- limiting the 
possibilities of 
hostile takeover 
of national 
energy 
companies;  
- securing the 
interests of the 
state (including 
State Treasury) in 
the strategic 
energy 
companies. 
- maintaining 
support for 
producers of 
energy from RSE 
and  its 
introduction for 
heat producers;  
- increasing the 
share of bio 
components in  
transport fuel;  
- exempting 
energy from RSE 
from excise tax;  
- supporting the 
Polish 
manufacturers 
producing 
devices and 
equipment for 
RSE.  
- legal regulation of 
nuclear energy sector; 
- preparing Polish 
industry to 
participation in the 
nuclear energy 
programme,  
- identifying the 
accessibility of 
uranium deposits in 
Poland. 
Development 
of 
infrastructure 
- development of 
scientific and 
research 
infrastructure for 
energy sector, 
especially 
nuclear energy.  
- diversification 
of supply 
directions and 
sources of 
energy,  
- enhancing the 
regional energy 
market in 
international 
trade.  
 
- introduction of 
energy 
performance 
certificates for 
buildings; 
- introduction of 
energy 
efficiency 
standards for 
public sector; 
- using EU 
funding, 
NFOŚiGW(1) 
and FTiR(2) to 
improve energy 
- diversification 
of supply 
directions and 
sources of energy 
,  
- expansion of 
distribution and 
transmission 
networks (also 
with other EU 
Member States);  
- building storage 
capacity for 
energy resources; 
- support for 
construction of 
agricultural 
biogas plants;  
- removing legal 
barriers to new 
infrastructure 
projects;  
- construction of 
infrastructure 
with EU and 
NFOŚiGW 
funding,  
- using State 
-preparing 
government nuclear 
energy programme;  
- construction of 
nuclear power plants,  
- construction of 
nuclear waste storage;  
- preparation of 
transmission network 
for nuclear power 
plants.  
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efficiency of 
buildings.  - construction of 
LNG terminal;  
- construction 
and 
modernisation of 
energy 
generating 
infrastructure;  
- removing legal 
barriers to new 
infrastructure 
projects;  
- legal changes to 
increase the 
investment in 
energy by local 
governments. 
Treasury 
infrastructure for 
RSE production.  
Development 
of human 
capital 
--- --- - information 
campaigns 
promoting 
rational use of 
energy.  
--- --- - education of 
personnel for nuclear 
energy sector; 
- educating the public 
on nuclear energy; 
- public consultations 
of the government 
nuclear energy 
programme.  
(1) NFOŚiGW: National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management.  
(2) Thermomodernisation Fund.  
(3) RSE: Renewable Sources of Energy.  
Implementation of action in support of low carbon economy 
Since the planning of strategic action for low carbon economy has started in Poland 
quite recently – its implementation has also been delayed. Therefore it is rather 
difficult to assess its effectiveness. Especially as some experts view the 
government’s activity as mere declarations which are not effectively 
implemented53. An additional difficulty is the lack of a leading strategic 
government document both on the economic policy and in relation to low carbon 
industrial policy.  As a result, there is no coherent system of monitoring and 
evaluation of those policies. Still another problem is posed by the dispersion of the 
works and planning documents within Polish government. That results in the lack 
of proper cooperation during the implementation stage.   
Because of budget restrictions and the lack of industrial policy tradition after 
the political system transformation in 1989, legislation is the main area of 
government activity. This applies particularly to the implementation of EU law. 
                                                 
53 An interview with M. Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), March 2011; an interview with D. 
Ledworowski (Public Board for the National Programme of Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011.  
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The work has, however, been delayed. An example can be a few months lag in 
introducing into the national legal system of the EU directives on energy efficiency 
(2006/32/EC) and on renewable energy sources (2009/28/EC)54. The work on 
provisions concerning the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity was also 
delayed55. As a result, Polish nuclear energy programme has been postponed by at 
least two years and the first nuclear power plant may start operation in 2022 at the 
earliest56.  
The policy of the Polish government shifts most of the costs of adapting Polish 
economy to the requirements of CEP to the market. It is worth noting that this is 
consistent with the EU approach. The implementation of the CEP is to be achieved 
through investment made by enterprises, including, among others, the emission 
allowances auctioning system and the development of the internal energy market 
in the EU57. Public investment projects are to be only of supplementary nature, for 
instance, when a project is not attractive enough for the market to finance or when 
public funds are expected to stimulate market investment. Such an approach 
means that investment in energy and environmental projects will cause dramatic 
rise of electricity prices for the industry and individual consumers (especially so as 
the Polish government is planning to free the energy prices for households58). 
According to various estimates, the price rise may reach from 50 to even 100%59. 
This carries a threat of reduced competitiveness of the economy and decreasing the 
welfare of the society. It may also reduce foreign investment and lead to relocation 
of production from Poland to third countries. What is more, the rise of energy 
prices does not guarantee additional investment. Even though in the recent years 
the wholesale price of energy has gone up over 60%, investment in power plants 
has not grown60. This is related, among other things, to the specific nature of 
operation of the big energy groups which operate in many countries. They can use 
income generated on one market for investing in another. Yet another negative 
factor influencing investment by companies in Poland is the lack of clarity of EU 
regulations, especially those concerning the allocation of free emission rights for 
the energy sector during the transition period (2013-2020). 
Without public aid, the energy sector will not be able to increase the capacity 
and to adjust to the requirements of the CEP. The investment potential of the 
sector, including its loan eligibility and the financial capability of Polish banks, is 
too small as compared to the needs. Experts assume61, that if the involvement of 
companies were to reach the maximum level of 20 billion euro by the year 2020 – at 
least 30 billion euro of necessary investment would still be missing. Investment is 
not sufficiently stimulated by the “coloured” energy certificates scheme62, under 
                                                 
54 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 19, 22. 
55 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 24. 
56 Waldemar Pawlak forsuje pakiet atomowy, Rzeczpospolita daily, 17-01-2011.  
57 See Conclusions, European Council, 4 February 2011, EUCO 2/11, Brussels, p. 3.  
58 Uwolnienie cen prądu dla konsumentów w 2012 roku, Rzeczpospolita daily, 01-03-2011. .  
59 Transition to a Low-emissions Economy In Poland, p. 17; Polski nie stać na pakiet 3x20 - wywiad z M. Sworą, 
Prezesem Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, Energetyka cieplna i zawodowa, no. 4, 2010, pp. 10-13.  
60 Krzysztof Żmijewski: Sektor energetyczny potrzebuje 100 mld euro, Rzeczpospolita daily, 8-11-2010.  
61 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 37.  
62 The “coloured” certificates scheme – introduced in Poland, among other countries, operates in such a way that green 
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which green energy producers can generate income by trading their certificates. 
According to experts63 such income exceeds 1 billion Euro per annum, but the 
weakness of the scheme lies in the fact that while supporting the producers, it does 
not ensure that new investment in the energy sector is made. Another consequence 
of Europeanisation in the area under discussion is neglecting investment in the 
coal-mining sector, which resulted in Poland becoming a net importer of coal64. 
This poses a serious threat to the energy security of the economy.   
Experts point out65 to the insufficient use of the domestic financial instruments. 
The scope of support granted by the National  Fund for Environmental Protection 
and Water Management [NFOŚiGW] and the Thermomodernisation Fund [FtiR] is 
too small. The domestic instruments have at their disposal mainly the funds from 
the sale of emission allowances  (the so called Green Investment Scheme66) or 
substitution fees or penalties connected with fulfilling the obligation to acquire and 
submit for redemption the energy certificates of origin (the so called “coloured” 
certificates scheme). They are thus financed, to a great extent, by the business. In 
the Polish reality the funds are quite substantial (see Table 5), although still 
insufficient in relation to the needs of low carbon economy. They have been 
designed mainly to address two objectives: improve energy efficiency and RSE. 
The relevant government agencies and ministries are not very good at coordinating 
individual activities. This is a consequence of the lack of a proper institutional 
system for national development policy (a system that would not be related to the 
implementation of the EU cohesion policy). In addition, at the time of budget 
restrictions connected with excessive public debt – the energy sector is one of the 
places where funds are sought to support the state budget. The fiscal burdens 
imposed on energy in Poland are among the highest in the EU and exceed 23%67. 
In such a situation even the income from the sale of CO2 emission rights is 
threatened, as, according to experts68, instead of being used for investment in 
energy sector, it might go straight to the state budget. And these are potentially 
amounts reaching from approximately 1.3 billion in 2013 to over 3.3 billion euro in 
2020.    
 
                                                                                                                                                     
energy producers are awarded a transferable certificate for every unit of generated energy. They get income both from 
physical sale of energy and from trading the certificates. The prices of energy and the certificates are determined on the 
electricity market. The government sets the quantitative targets for the share of green energy and the market participants 
who sell energy to end users either buy an approprite number of certificates or they have to pay a penalty or a substitute 
fee. These are paid to the state budget and are in part used for co-funding low carbon investment projects. See R. 
Gnatowska (2010): Charakterystyka polskiego systemu certyfikacji pochodzenia energii elektrycznej, Polityka 
Energetyczna, Vol. 13, Booklet 2, pp. 145-155; K. Żmijewski (2011): ABC kolorowej certyfikacji, Materiały Budowlane, 
no. 1, pp. 8-11.  
63 An interview with K. Żmijewskim (Secretary General of the Polish Board for the National Programme of Emissions’ 
Reduction), March 2011.  
64 Polska nadal importerem węgla netto, Rzeczpospolita daily, 19-01-2011.  
65 Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 26. 
66 GIS – Green Investment Scheme is derived from the emission trading mechanism agreed in the Kyoto Protocol. It is 
connected with “earmarking” of funding acquired from the sale of the excess of emission units in order to ensure that 
they are spent on clearly defined objectives related to environmental protection in the state of the units’ seller. 
67 Polski nie stać na pakiet 3x20.  
68 Miliardy ze sprzedaży uprawnień do emisji CO2, Rzeczpospolita daily, 02-02-2011.  
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Thus the effectiveness of the domestic financial instruments may be very 
moderate. The forecasts related to activities implemented by NFOŚiGW indicate69, 
that, thanks to the investment made from the Fund, the efficiency of the end use of 
energy will, by the year 2016, increase by only approx. 0,67 Mtoe, which accounts 
for just 15 percent of the national target. Whereas the reduction of CO2 emissions 
as a result of all NFOŚiGW activities (including also the cohesion policy 
instruments) will, over the next seven years (2011-2017), amount only to 5 million 
tons70. It is a rather modest achievement, considering that the annual limit of free 
emission allowances for Poland in the years 2008-2012 is more than 208 million 
tons.  
A very low level of domestic public funds involvement in innovative projects 
and in development of new low carbon technologies should also be noted. It is 
only limited to a small number of research programmes funded by the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education (Table 5)71. This is indeed a wider problem of the 
economic policy in Poland, where – so far – no national innovation scheme has 
been created, no scheme that would initiate research and development work suited 
to the goals of the national development policy and support the transfer of 
innovation and technology to business. In addition, only limited activities are 
undertaken in support of the development of human resources, including training 
and information activities, to meet the needs of low carbon economy (Table 5)72.  
In this situation, the main source of public funding for investment in Poland 
are EU funds. In the years 2007-2013 Poland has been the greatest beneficiary of the 
cohesion policy and may receive more than 67 billion euro from the EU budget 
(these funds must be supplemented with the mandatory domestic contribution). 
These funds have been, for many years, the main and in a number of areas, the 
only source of funding for development investment73. Specialists claim74 that they 
are rather loosely related to the CEP objectives and their support for the 
development of low carbon economy is not strong enough. Instead, they indirectly 
contribute to the increase of emissions mainly because most of the funds support 
the development of transport infrastructure. This is an example of a lack of 
homogeneity or even contradiction between various trends of Europeanisation. 
Under the cohesion policy implemented in the years 2007-2013, the main 
instruments of support for the energy policy (including low carbon economy) has 
been the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (OP IE) and the 
sixteen regional operational programmes (16 ROP). They have been designed 
mainly to address infrastructure objectives, concerning improvement of energy 
efficiency, energy security and RSE (Table 5). For these objectives, under those 
                                                 
69 NFOŚiGW na rzecz efektywności energetycznej, NFOŚiGW 2010, p. 16.  
70 Ibidem, p. 20.  
71 Examples of research programmes implemented in the years 2007-2010: Materials and technologies for hydrogen 
management development basing on the industrial process gases; Chemistry of prospect processes and byproducts of coal 
conversion; Supercritical coal-fired power units; Modern technologies for the energy use of biomass and bio-degradable 
waste. See Ocena realizacji Polityki Energetycznej od 2005 roku, Ministry of Economy, Warsaw 2009, p. 16.  
72 A similar view: Zielona Księga Narodowego Programu Redukcji Emisji Gazów Cieplarnianych, p. 16.  
73 T. G. Grosse  (2006): An Evaluation of the Regional Policy System in Poland: Challenges and Threats Emerging from 
Participation in the EU’s Cohesion Policy, European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 151-165.   
74 A. Kassenberg (2009).  
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programmes, only less than 2.5% of all cohesion policy funding in Poland has been 
allocated. Just to compare, for the development of transport infrastructure, during 
the same time, more than 24% of funds have been allocated. Moreover, the 
European policy does not sufficiently develop low carbon technologies or support 
their application by business. Thus, it only marginally contributes to the 
achievement of one of the main goals of the CEP, namely, the promotion of 
innovative technology within the framework of “green” economy75. This is a 
serious problem of cohesion funds, which fail to sufficiently stimulate the 
development of innovative and competitive economy in the more slowly 
developing countries of Central Europe76. As a result, the support from the 
cohesion policy (under its current investment direction) is definitely insufficient 
when set against the needs of the development of low carbon economy. If one 
assumed that the adaptation to the CEP requirements in Poland entails investment 
in the order of 100 billion euro then the European Union support available under 
the cohesion policy will amount to less than 2% of this sum.    
 
Table 5. Selected low carbon economy implementation activities in relation to the priorities of 
economic policy (2007-2011)77  
Main 
priorities of 
economic 
policy  
 
 
Advanced 
technologie
s 
Competition 
on energy 
market 
 
Energy efficiency  
 
Energy 
security 
 
Developmen
t of RSE  
 
Developme
nt of 
nuclear 
energy 
Development 
of innovative 
economy  
- 
development 
of energy 
technologies 
(OP IEc) (3);  
- launching of 
a series of 
national 
research 
programmes 
(MNiSzW) 
(8).  
- 
implementatio
n of EU 
directives on 
electricity 
market 
(2003/54/EC) 
and natural 
gas market 
(2003/55/EC);  
- process of 
consolidation 
of energy 
companies;  
- freeing of 
energy prices 
- setting the national 
target for energy 
saving (2007);  
- analysis of energy 
efficiency of 
individual branches 
of economy (Ministry 
of Economy);  
- effective use of 
energy by companies 
(NFOŚiGW: 500 million 
euro in the years 2011-
2016) (4).  
 - regulation of 
RSE, including 
an obligation 
to buy RSE by 
energy 
suppliers, 
introduction of 
discounts for 
connection of 
RSE to the 
power grid.  
- 
negotiations 
concerning 
the purchase 
of 
technology 
for nuclear 
energy 
sector from 
a foreign 
partner.  
                                                 
75 See Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission...; A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low 
carbon  economy  In  2050,  pp.  5,  12;  Y.  Hongyuan  (2009):  Two  Logics  of  Climate  Change  Games:  Environmental 
Governance and Know‐How Competition, w: A. Gradziuk, E. Wyciszkiewicz  (red.): Energy Security and Climate Change. 
Double Challenge for Policymakers, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, 125‐152.     
76 More: T. G. Grosse (2010): EU Cohesion Policy and the peripheries of the New Member States.  
77 Based on: National Strategic Framework Reference 2007-2013; Ocena realizacji polityki energetycznej od 2005 roku 
[Assessment of the implementation of energy policy since 2005], Ministry of Economy, Warsaw 2009; National Action 
Plan for Energy Efficiency 2007, Warsaw 2007; National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management: 
http://www.nfosigw.gov.pl including: NFOŚiGW na rzecz efektywności energetycznej, NFOŚiGW 2010.   
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(2007) then 
restoring the 
regulation of 
prices for 
individual 
consumers 
(2008). 
Development 
of 
infrastructur
e 
- planned 
extension of the 
coloured 
certificates 
scheme (adding 
orange 
certificates to 
support CCS 
technology).  
 - introduction of  a 
coloured certificates 
scheme, especially the 
planned introduction of 
the so called white 
certificates;  
- 
implementation 
of the EU 
directive 
(2004/8/EC) on 
supporting 
cogeneration;  
- implementation of 
EU directive 
(2002/91/EC) on the 
energy performance 
of buildings;  
- development of 
infrastructure for 
improving energy 
efficiency, 
cogeneration and 
improvement of 
energy management 
(OP IE: 324.5 million 
euro*(1); 16 ROP: 
118,5 million 
euro*(2));  
- improvement of 
energy efficiency in 
public buildings 
(NFOŚiGW: 792 million 
euro in the years 2010-
2013);  
- improvement of 
energy efficiency in 
housing (FTiR: approx. 
38 million euro in 2010) 
(5). 
-
thermomodernisation 
of buildings and 
district heating 
networks (GEF: 
- development 
of electrical 
TEN-E (OP IE: 
213,9 million 
euro*);  
- development 
of natural gas 
TEN-E (OP IE: 
206 million 
euro*). 
- starting the 
construction of a 
LNG terminal at 
Świnoujście;  
- cooperation 
with the 
Vysehrad 
Group states on 
the EU energy 
policy and new 
TEN-E 
investment 
projects.  
- 
introductio
n  of a 
green 
certificates 
scheme;  
- development 
of wind RSE 
(OP IE: 172 
million euro*; 
16 ROP: 44.4 
million euro*); 
- development 
of solar RSE 
(OP IE: 12.9 
million euro*; 
16 ROP: 45 
million euro*); 
- development 
of biomass 
RSE (OP IE: 
202 million 
euro*; 16 ROP: 
61.6 million 
euro*); 
- development 
of other RSE 
(OP IE: 43 
million euro*; 
16 ROP: 83.7 
million euro*); 
- loans and 
subsidies for 
development 
of RSE 
(NFOŚiGW: 670 
million euro in 
the years 2011-
- adoption 
by the 
government 
of a set of 
laws under 
the nuclear 
energy 
programme 
(2011).  
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Global Environmental 
Facility: approx. 37 
million euro) (9).  
2013). 
 
Development 
of human 
capital 
  - environmental 
education, including 
energy efficiency 
(NFOŚiGW: 48 million 
euro in the years 2011-
2013). 
   
*     In the cohesion policy programmes only the EU funds contribution has been listed, without the domestic matching 
funding.  
(1) PO IE: Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment (EU Cohesion Policy in the years 2007-2013). 
(2) 16 ROP: 16 Regional Operational Programmes (EU Cohesion Policy in the years 2007-2013). 
(3) PO IEc: Operational Programme Innovative Economy (EU Cohesion Policy in the years 2007-2013). 
(4) NFOŚiGW: National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management.  
(5) FTiR: Thermomodernisation Fund.  
(6) RSE: Renewable Sources of Energy.  
(7) TEN-E: trans-European energy networks.  
(8) MNiSzW: Ministry of Science and Higher Education.  
(9) GEF: Global Environmental Facility.   
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The economic crisis (2008-2010) has made the economic competition more fierce, 
both on the common market and globally. At the same time, it has intensified the 
activity of politicians, aimed at finding competitive advantage for European 
businesses. A good example of such a trend is the EU climate policy. One of its 
goals is to build economic competitiveness in the area of low carbon technologies, 
and especially to use the existing potential of some European economies with 
respect to technological advancement and access to clean energy sources. The rules 
of the CEP produce unequal consequences for individual Member States. They 
bring benefits to the better developed countries with technological advantage, and, 
at the same time, they impose excessive cost burden on the less developed 
economies based on coal, thus decreasing their cost-effectiveness. This way, 
European regulations may support competitiveness of some EU Member States on 
the common market, and simultaneously weaken others. This is of great 
importance for employment and the rate of economic growth in individual 
countries.  
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The phenomenon is confirmed by earlier research on Europeanisation78. Its 
results show that European regulations and policies have strong impact on 
national economic policies and on the institutional system of the economy (the 
national model of capitalism79). This impact varies depending on local conditions. 
Wherever the EU policy is not consistent with the local logic of the economic 
system, it leads to serious costs, decreasing of the system’s internal rationality of 
operation or to its gradual de-institutionalisation. This is also an example of 
individual states using European policies to maximise their benefits on the 
common market, among others, through such design of EU regulations that will 
strengthen their national competitive advantage and reduce the possible costs of 
introducing the EU law80. This requires the national governments to be politically 
active on the EU forum and to ensure close coordination with the national 
development policy.  
An additional difficulty resulting from Europeanisation are the serious 
constraints concerning granting of public aid by national governments. EU 
regulations do permit granting of aid to the sectors susceptible to high cost of 
electricity or transfer of production abroad. The provisions, however, are not very 
precise and, what is more, the Polish state has limited capability to grant such 
support in a situation of growing public debt. On the other hand, the cohesion 
policy funding, designed for the less developed Member States, only to a limited 
extent supports the development of low carbon economy. In particular, it is not 
good at stimulating the development of “green” economy where competitiveness 
is based on the use of modern technology.  
The Europeanisation processes related to climate policy are particularly 
disadvantageous for Polish economy. Its competitiveness is based primarily on low 
production costs and at the same time, the main source of energy is a high-
emission type of fuel – coal. Thus, a consequence of implementing the CEP in 
Poland and of pursuing the current Polish economic model may be the escape of 
some industries outside the country, also to other EU Member States. Another 
possibility is the reduction of the GDP growth rate and increase of unemployment. 
In this situation, it is a challenge for the Polish government either to mitigate the 
EU CEP or to fundamentally change the model of development for the national 
economy.     
This will require a coherent long-term economic policy and intensive political 
activity on the EU level. Whereas currently in Poland there exists neither a long-
term strategy for national development nor a policy for the development of low 
                                                 
78 M. Höpner, A. Schäfer (2007): A New Phase of European Integration. Organized Capitalism In Post-Ricardian Europe, 
MPIfG Disscussion Paper 07/04, pp. 8, 22.  
79 P. Hall, D. Soskice (ed.) (2001): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. 
Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1-44; B. Amable (2003): The Diversity of Modern Capitalism, Oxford – 
New York: Oxford University Press, 103-114, 176; J. Alber (2006): The European Social Model and the United States, 
European Union Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 393-419.  
80 See M. P. Smith (2005): Germany’s Quest for a New EU Industrial Policy: Why it is Failing, German Politics, vol. 14, 
nr 3, 315-331; H. Callaghan, M. Höpner (2005): European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political 
Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization, Comparative European Politics, nr 3, 307-332. 
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carbon economy. All the action undertaken in this area takes place in response to 
the initiatives of European policies and is, to a great extent, limited to 
implementing EU regulations. Thus, what happens is the gradual, although 
delayed, implementation of the CEP requirements, yet without proper support for 
national enterprises. What is also missing is such a re-orientation of the investment 
processes that would strengthen the competitiveness of national economy. 
Consistently with the philosophy adopted under the CEP – the policy of the Polish 
government shifts most of the costs related to adapting the national economy to 
the Package requirements to the market. Business is supported by the state budget 
only to a very limited extent. The activities of individual public bodies focus on the 
implementation of narrowly defined sector strategies  and are not properly 
coordinated, either at the planning or at the implementation stage.  Additional 
difficulty is the lack of continuity in the policy of the state by subsequent 
governments.     
Another problem is the weakness of the political activity of the Polish 
government at the EU level. Whereas in the context of European integration it is an 
indispensable element of an effective economic policy of every Member State. The 
results of this report show that the political activity of subsequent Polish 
governments in this respect is passive and severely delayed. Inter-ministerial 
coordination fails, which is a result of the poor system of EU policy management 
by Polish government. The coordination is mostly carried out by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs81. Whereas examples of other countries prove that it is much more 
effective if the responsibility for coordination lies with the chancellery of the head 
of the government82. The weakness of Polish European policy is partly a result of 
the lack of the proper national economic policy. As a result, Poland adopts a 
reactive approach towards initiatives originating at EU institutions. This may be 
shown by a number of strategic documents which are drafted almost only for the 
purpose of the implementation of EU policies.   
In connection with the EU climate policy, Poland faces a challenge of a 
fundamental change of its economic model – to low carbon economy based on 
innovation and environment-friendly technologies. This requires the preparation 
of a long-term policy of the development of low carbon economy. It is necessary to 
make an in-depth analysis and diagnosis of the condition of Polish economy as 
well as assess the consequences of implementing the CEP for individual sectors 
and regions. This policy cannot be limited  only to the implementation of the 
Package requirements but it must, first of all, aim to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the national economy. It should not involve only the energy 
sector but must also cover other sectors of the economy83. The goal of such a policy 
should be to support development research and the development of low carbon 
technologies84, as it is one of the main priorities of the EU climate policy. For this 
                                                 
81 See Act dated 27 August 2009 on the European Affairs Committee, Journal of Laws of 2009 no. 161, item 1277.  
82 S. James (2010): Adapting to Brussels: Europeanization of the core executive and the ‘strategic projection’ model, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 17:6, 818-835.  
83 An interview with D. Kulczycka (PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011.  
84 An interview with Prof. K. Żmijewski (Secretary General of the Public Board for National Programme of Emissions’ 
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purpose, a strong National Innovation Scheme should be created, with 
implementation of low carbon economic policy of the government as one of its 
priorities.   
Government policy should support energy efficiency and investment projects 
focusing on the development of renewable sources of energy85. In both cases, there 
is a relatively big potential for such activity in Poland. Experts86 recommend, 
among other solutions, a reform of the coloured certificates scheme so that it could 
support not only the producers but, first of all, those who invest in the new energy 
generation capacity. In addition, the certificate scheme should be more effective in 
reducing the price of energy87. The existing administrative barriers to the 
development of RES should be removed, mechanisms of public-private 
partnership in this area should be developed and technological solutions 
implemented in microscale should be supported (such as solar panels, biogas 
plants, etc.)88. The government should, to a greater extent, encourage people to 
save energy, also by imposing an obligation on the public sector to increase energy 
efficiency (e.g. in public buildings)89. The development of energy market should be 
supported, also through construction of cross border interconnectors which will 
make it possible to benefit from the offer of foreign energy producers90. In 
addition, public aid should be granted (within the scope of the EU law) to sectors 
at risk of production transfer abroad. The point is to support the necessary 
investment that the companies need to make. An important element of the 
government policy should be to divide the funds acquired under the community 
emissions trading scheme, which, under the EU law, may be allocated, for 
example, to the development of RES, energy efficiency and CCS installations. 
These funds should not be used as a remedy to excessive deficit or public debt. A 
system of “green” public procurement could also be developed, so that the criteria 
of energy efficiency and use of RSE were taken into account91. The state’s economic 
policy should also be more focused on developing the services sector and the 
development of human resources for the low carbon economy.  
Appropriate institutions should be built for effective coordination and 
implementation of the government’s low carbon policy. As early as at the planning 
stage, the low carbon economy strategy could be used for proper coordination of 
activities between sectors and for binding this strategy even more to the main goals 
of the government’s economic policy. It would thus become a “second-level” 
strategy, coordinating the leading national development strategy with the sector-
                                                                                                                                                     
Reduction), March 2011, an interview with D. Kulczycka (PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011.  
85 An interview with Prof. K. Żmijewski (Secretary General of the Public Board for National Programme of Emissions’ 
Reduction), March 2011; an interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011.  
86 An interview with M. Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), March 2011; an interview with Prof. 
K. Żmijewski (Secretary General of the Public Board for National Programme of Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011.  
87 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011.  
88 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011.  
89 An interview with M. Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), March 2011; an interview with A. 
Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011.  
90 An interview with M. Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), March 2011; an interview with D. 
Kulczycka (PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011; an interview with D. Ledworowski (Public Board for National Programme 
of Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011.  
91 An interview with D. Kulczycka (PKPP Lewiatan), March 2011.  
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specific documents. An appropriate system is also needed for implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of national development policies.  The system of 
institutions created for the implementation of the cohesion and the regional 
policies could be used for this purpose. I have in mind here, for instance, 
application of territorial (voivodship) contract instruments or regional operational 
programmes implemented by voivodship authorities. Using the instruments of 
regional policy to implement the low carbon economic policy of the government is 
driven by the specific territorial nature of the country, which requires flexible 
instruments. In addition, a number of activities aimed at improving energy 
efficiency or development of RES may be successfully carried out on the regional 
or even local scale. Appropriate incentives should be introduced for local 
governments to encourage their greater involvement in action for low carbon 
economy92. Another instrument may be the above mentioned innovation policy of 
the government and the creation of a strong National Innovation Scheme. The 
activities under the Scheme may be also partially implemented in a decentralised 
way, with the support of voivodship authorities. A reform of the public finance 
system is absolutely necessary in order to increase the pool of funds for investment 
related to low carbon policy93. Other funding for this policy may come from the 
Community Emissions Trading Scheme and the Green Investment Scheme94.  
Another challenge is to improve the political activity of the Polish government 
at the EU arena, by taking advantage of the Polish Presidency in the EU (in 2011), 
in order to play a more active part in developing detailed solutions implementing 
the CEP. Experts agree95 that at the current stage of the European debate, there is 
little chance to re-negotiate the CEP to make it more beneficial for Polish economy. 
Nevertheless, they suggest that certain action should be taken, for instance, to 
strive for reducing the cost of emission allowances, including imposing limits on 
the purchase of allowances by entities from outside the EU or by investment-
speculation funds. They also suggest that the unused parts of the allocation could 
be transferred from non-ETS area to EU ETS or outside the EU (the so called flexible 
trading & offset model)96. It is a challenge for Polish diplomacy to participate in the 
negotiations over the future of EU policy after the year 2020 related to the road 
map for competitive and low carbon economy97. The active participation of the 
government in the works on the details of the European industrial policy referred 
to in “Europe 2020” may be of great importance.  In addition, the EU cohesion 
policy should be re-oriented towards supporting low carbon economy objectives, 
and, especially, the development of low carbon technologies and their economic 
application in the least developed EU Member States98. Unfortunately, such tasks 
                                                 
92 An interview with T. Chruszczow (Ministry of Environment), March 2011. 
93 See T. G. Grosse (2010): Bariery dla skoku cywilizacyjnego Polski 2010-2030.  
94 See footnote 76.  
95 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011; an interview with M. 
Sobolewski (Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm), March 2011.  
96 See Z. M. Karaczun, A. Kassenberg, M. Sobolewski (2009), s. 46-47; K. Żmijewski (2011), p. 5.  
97 A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy In 2050; an interview with A. Błachowicz (Ministry of 
Environment), March 2011.  
98 An interview with A. Kassenberg (Institute for Sustainable Development), March 2011; an interview with D. 
Ledworowski (Public Board for National Programme of Emissions’ Reduction), March 2011.  
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feature neither in the Polish government’s position on the future of the cohesion 
policy after 201399, nor in the preliminary priorities for the Polish Presidency of the 
European Union Council100.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 See The position of the Government of Poland on the future of the cohesion policy after 2013. „Polityka Spójności jako 
skuteczna, efektywna i terytorialnie zróżnicowana odpowiedź na wyzwania rozwojowe Unii Europejskiej”, adopted by 
the Council of Ministers on 18 August 2010.  
100 Preliminary piorities of the Polish Presidency approved, http://prezydencjaue.gov.pl, 20.03.2011.  
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